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Many philosophers hold that whether an act is overall morally obligatory is an ‘objective’
matter, many that it is a ‘subjective’ matter, and some that it is both. The idea that it
is or can be both may seem to promise a helpful answer to the question ‘What ought
I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?’ In this article, three broad views are
distinguished regarding what it is that obligation essentially concerns: the maximization
of actual value, the maximization of expected value, and the perceived maximization of
actual value. The first and third views are rejected; the second view is then refined and
defended. The unfortunate upshot is that there may be no very helpful answer to the
question just mentioned. As to the question posed in the title of the article, the answer
unsurprisingly depends on what ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are taken to mean.
I
Almost everyone acknowledges the ambiguity of ‘ought’, even when it
is restricted to moral contexts.1 One distinction is that between using
‘ought’ to express an ideal (as in ‘No child ought to have to suffer’) and
using it to express an obligation (as in ‘You ought to keep your promise’).
Within the province of moral obligation, there is the distinction between
what W. D. Ross calls prima facie obligation and what many call all-
things-considered obligation but which I, for brevity, will call overall
obligation. Within the province of overall obligation, many philosophers
allege that there is yet a further ambiguity between what are often
called objective obligation and subjective obligation. This allegation is
the subject of this article.
It is with overall moral obligation that the morally conscientious
person is primarily concerned. When one wonders what to do in a parti-
cular situation and asks, out of conscientiousness, ‘What ought I to do?’,
the ‘ought’ expresses overall moral obligation. ‘Ought’ here is a contrary
of ‘wrong’. Conscientiousness precludes deliberately doing what one
believes to be overall morally wrong.2
As I understand the debate between consequentialists and non-con-
sequentialists, their disagreement concerns what it is that overall
moral obligation consists in. I will not engage in this debate here. For
1 An exception: Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice (Princeton, 2001),
pp. 44 ff.
2 This is not to say that conscientiousness requires deliberately doing only what one
believes to be overall morally right, since on occasion one may find oneself forced to act
while lacking any belief about the overall moral status of one’s act.
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the sake of convenience, I will adopt an approach that is typical of one
kind of consequentialism. (I believe that my findings could be adapted to
other kinds of consequentialism and to non-consequentialism, too, but I
will not pursue this point.) On this approach, what we ought to do (in the
sense that expresses overall moral obligation) is a function of the value
of what we do, which is itself a function of some non-evaluative ‘stuff ’.
(My use of the term ‘stuff’ is intended to be metaphysically neutral.) For
example, utilitarians (as portrayed by G. E. Moore3) believe that what
we ought to do is perform that act with the highest instrumental value,
which itself consists in bringing about the most favourable balance
of pleasure over pain. Most consequentialists follow utilitarianism in
saying that overall moral obligation involves maximizing the relevant
value; others take a more relaxed stand.4 Again, for the sake of
convenience, I will adopt a maximizing approach. (I believe that my
findings could be adapted to non-maximizing approaches, too, but I
will not pursue this point either.)
We are now in a position to distinguish three broad views concerning
what we ought, in the sense of overall moral obligation, to do. Using
the term ‘actual value’ to refer to the value (whatever that may be) that
resides in the stuff of moral obligation (whatever that may be), we may
put these views as follows:
1. An agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would
(uniquely) maximize actual value (among the range of options
that the agent has);5
2. an agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would
maximize expected value;
3. an agent ought to perform an act if and only if he (or she) believes
that doing so would maximize actual value.
It is usually something like View 1 that is said to express the idea
that obligation is ‘objective’, but not always; Bertrand Russell, for
example, says this of something like View 2.6 There is no such consensus
concerning the idea that obligation is ‘subjective’. Many philosophers
say that something like View 2 captures this idea;7 many others say
3 G. E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford, 1912), chs. 1 and 2.
4 For example, Michael Slote, ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 58 (1984).
5 The two phrases in parentheses are to be understood to be implicitly at work not
only in the statement of this view (View 1) but also in the statement of all such views to
follow (View 2, View 3, etc.).
6 Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (London, 1910), pp. 30–1.
7 For example: Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht, 1986), p. 46; Frank
Jackson, ‘A Probabilistic Approach to Moral Responsibility’, Logic, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science VII, ed. R. B. Marcus et al. (Amsterdam, 1986); Allan Gibbard,
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 42; John Broome, ‘The Structure
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that something like View 3 does so;8 a few say this of both View 2 and
View 3.9
There is disagreement among philosophers whether each of
Views 1–3 captures a legitimate sense of ‘ought’. There is reason to
think that it does. If ‘ought’ is ambiguous in other ways, why not in this
way too? Indeed, acknowledging such ambiguity may seem helpful.
Consider the plight of the conscientious person who has searched in
vain for an answer to the question ‘What ought I to do?’ and yet finds
himself forced to make a decision. In such a case he might say: ‘Well,
I have not been able to figure out what I ought to do. Now what ought
I to do?’10 If we do not distinguish between senses of ‘ought’, this is a
puzzling question. The only answer can be, ‘You ought to do whatever
it is that you ought to do, whether you know what that is or not’. This
is a singularly unhelpful response. If we do distinguish between senses
of ‘ought’, though, another answer might be given: ‘When you do not
know what you ought (objectively) to do, you ought (subjectively) to
do such-and-such’. Depending on the specification of ‘such-and-such’
(perhaps in terms of View 2 or View 3), this looks like it could be
helpful.
Someone who answers the conscientious person’s inquiry in the
manner just noted would say, in response to the question posed in
the title of this article, that overall moral obligation is both objective
and subjective – or, more carefully, that there are both objective and
subjective kinds of overall moral obligation. Despite the appeal of such
a position, there is nonetheless reason to think that it is mistaken – to
think, that is, that there is just one kind of overall moral obliga-
tion (whether objective, or subjective, or neither). Notice, first, that
of Good: Decision Theory and Ethics’, Foundations of Decision Theory, ed. M. Bacharach
and S. Hurley (Oxford, 1991); Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction (Lanham,
2002), p. 126.
8 For example: Russell, Essays, pp. 32 ff.; W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford,
1939), pp. 146–7; H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford, 1949), p. 18; Richard B.
Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 1959), pp. 365–6.
9 For example: A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (London, 1948), pp. 120–1; Derek
Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), p. 25; Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics
(Boulder, 1998), p. 65; Frances Howard-Snyder, ‘It’s the Thought that Counts’, Utilitas 17
(2005), p. 266. (I became aware of Howard-Snyder’s article only after this article had been
written.) Ewing and Howard-Snyder emphasize the distinction between Views 2 and 3;
Parfit and Kagan do not. One could imagine a fourth view being proposed in this context:
An agent ought to perform an act if and only if he believes that doing so would maximize
expected value. At times, Elinor Mason (in ‘Consequentialism and the “Ought Implies
Can” Principle’, American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2003)) appears to propose this
view (see especially p. 327). Compare also Torbjörn Tännsjö, Hedonistic Utilitarianism
(Edinburgh, 1998), p. 34. I will not discuss this view further.
10 I owe this way of framing the issue to Fred Feldman (in private correspondence).
Compare Fred Feldman, ‘Actual Utility, the Objection from Impracticality, and the Move
to Expected Utility’, Philosophical Studies 129 (2006), p. 67.
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regardless of just how the ‘such-and-such’ is specified, there is the
threat of a regress. The answer just given to the conscientious person
has this form: ‘When you do not know what you ought1 to do, you ought2
to do such-and-such’. But that suggests another question, ‘What ought
I to do when I do not know what I ought2 to do?’, which in turn suggests
another answer: ‘When you do not know what you ought2 to do, you
ought3 to do so-and-so’. But that suggests yet another question, with
yet another answer, and so on and on. Even if we can find a way to halt
the regress, the prospect is disturbing. Should we really be prepared to
countenance such a proliferation of ‘oughts’?
Second, there is the nagging feeling that, far from being helpful, such
a proliferation of ‘oughts’ would succeed only in further confounding
decision-making. Consider what Ross says at one point when discussing
the matter of overall moral obligation:
[W]hen people express different opinions about the rightness or wrongness of
an act, the difference is often due to the fact that one of them is thinking of
objective and the other of subjective rightness. The recognition of the difference
between the two is therefore in itself important as tending to reconcile what
might otherwise seem irreconcilable differences of opinion.
Yet he immediately goes on to say: ‘But the question remains, which of
the characteristics – objective or subjective rightness – is ethically the
more important, which of the two acts is that which we ought to do’.11
At first, this may seem an odd question. If Ross is prepared to recognize
objective and subjective senses of ‘right’, why not also of ‘ought’? But
in fact there is clearly something to his question. We may pose it in
the following more general form: once the various ‘oughts’ (‘ought1’,
‘ought2’, and so on) have been distinguished, which is the one that
really counts? You may resist the question. ‘They all count’, you may
say. But they cannot all count equally, for then the agent would suffer
an embarrassment of riches. Suppose that, because of the quandary
you are in, various ‘oughts’ are said to apply: you ought1 to do A (even
if you do not know this), ought2 to do B (even if you do not know this),
ought3 to do C, and so on. If all these ‘oughts’ counted equally then,
given that you could not do all of A, B, C, and so on, you would be in a
moral dilemma. But, regardless of whether moral dilemmas should be
said to be possible,12 surely the mere fact that you are in a quandary
should not be thought sufficient to put you in a dilemma.13
11 Ross, Foundations, p. 147.
12 See Michael J. Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation (Cambridge, 1996),
ch. 7.
13 Compare Earl Conee, ‘Why Moral Dilemmas Are Impossible’, American Philoso-
phical Quarterly 26 (1989).
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There is therefore strong pressure to say that only one of the ‘oughts’
that apply really counts (or at least that, if any of the others count at all,
they do not count as much). But then that raises the question: which of
these ‘oughts’ is the one that really counts? (Alternatively, which ‘ought’
ought you to act on?) One answer is: that ‘ought’ about which you are
not ignorant. Thus, if you know what you ought1 to do, then that is what
you really ought to do. However, if you do not know what you ought1 to
do but do know what you ought2 to do, then that is what you really ought
to do. And so on. But that cannot be right, either. Ignorance cannot be
its own reward in this way, for that would render conscientious inquiry
otiose. Why bother trying to find out what you oughtn−1 to do? Just do
what you oughtn to do, and all will be well. But if such complacency
cannot be countenanced, that returns us to our original problem. If you
should not rest content with plumping for what you oughtn to do but
should instead (time permitting) aim at discovering and doing what you
oughtn−1 to do, then you should not rest content with doing what you
oughtn−1 to do but should instead aim at discovering and doing what
you oughtn−2 to do – and so on, all the way back to what you ought1
to do. But in that case all the ‘oughts’ other than ‘ought1’ would seem
superfluous; we should stick with objective obligation and renounce
any putative subjective obligation. But that then leaves us with the
‘singularly unhelpful’ response mentioned earlier.
We are thus faced with a puzzle. The question ‘What ought I to do
when I do not know what I ought to do?’ is perfectly cogent; its cogency
suggests a multiplicity of ‘oughts’; this multiplicity is unacceptable,
however, unless the various ‘oughts’ are prioritized; yet such priorit-
ization renders all subordinate ‘oughts’ redundant. How is this puzzle
to be resolved?
What follows is an attempt to answer this question and the more
general question posed in the title of this article. The plan of the article
is this: Section II – a discussion and rejection of View 3; Section III – a
discussion and rejection of View 1; Section IV – an elaboration of View 2;
Section V – a limited defense of View 2 and a resolution of the puzzle
just raised; Section VI – a discussion of the question whether overall
moral obligation is objective or subjective.
II
In order to check the credentials of Views 1–3, I will examine a series
of cases, each a version of one originally devised by Frank Jackson.14
Each version involves a physician, Jill, whose patient, John, suffers
14 Frank Jackson, ‘Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest
Objection’, Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 462–3. To my knowledge, the first appearance in print
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from a minor but not trivial skin complaint. Jill has three drugs to
choose from: A, B, and C. It is in fact the case that drug A will relieve
but not completely cure John’s condition, that drug B will completely
cure it, and that drug C will kill him. Now consider this version:
Version 1:
Jill knows that giving John drug A will cure him partially, giving him
drug B will cure him completely, giving him drug C will kill him, and
giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable.
Here, I think, there would be little hesitation on anyone’s part
concerning what Jill ought to do. All else being equal, Jill ought to give
John drug B. Given her knowledge about the efficacy of the alternative
treatments, there is no need to consider any other ‘oughts’ but this.
(Having said this, there is in fact reason to doubt this seemingly obvious
verdict. Promissory Note no. 1: I will return to this point in Section V.)
Problems arise, though, when truth, evidence, and belief do not
combine to provide Jill with such knowledge. Consider the following:
Version 2:
All the evidence at Jill’s disposal indicates what in fact is the case,
namely, that giving John drug A will cure him partially, giving him
drug B will cure him completely, giving him drug C will kill him,
and giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable. In
keeping with the evidence, Jill believes that giving John drug A
will cure him partially and that giving him no drug will render him
permanently incurable. However, despite the evidence, she believes
that giving him drug C will cure him completely and giving him drug
B will kill him.
Suppose that, acting on the basis of her beliefs, Jill gives John drug C
and thereby kills him. Clearly his death is very unfortunate, but should
we say that Jill did not do what she ought to have done (when ‘ought’
expresses overall moral obligation)? Should we say, that is, that she
did overall moral wrong in giving John drug C? Or should we say, as
View 3 dictates, that she acted as she ought to have done?
Some would deny that Jill acted as she ought to have done, on
the grounds that, in failing to heed the available evidence, she was
negligent and, in acting negligently, she did wrong. But this is doubly
mistaken. First, the failure to heed available evidence need not
constitute negligence. (Promissory Note no. 2: I will provide a brief
explanation of this in Section IV.) Second, negligent behavior need
of a case of this kind was in Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford,
1980), pp. 264–5.
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not constitute wrongdoing. (Promissory Note no. 3: I will provide a
brief explanation of this in a moment.) Nonetheless, I think we should
indeed reject both View 3 and its verdict in this case. I say this for three
reasons.
First, if Jill was not negligent, then she is certainly not to blame for
acting as she did; but that leaves unaffected the fact that what she did
was wrong. We must take care to distinguish the blameworthiness of
agents from the wrongness of actions; otherwise, excuses (of the sort
that consist in being blameless despite having done wrong) would be a
conceptual impossibility – which I take it they are not.15
Second, View 3 implies that all agents possess a certain sort of
potential moral infallibility. If (as seems plausible) we always know,
whenever we have a belief about what it would be best to do, what
it is that we believe, then, if View 3 were true and we knew this, we
would always know what we ought to do. But this makes a mockery of
the conscientious person’s inquiry into what he ought to do, implying
that such an inquiry can be successfully carried out simply via intro-
spection.
Third, View 3 implies that, on the assumption that he was doing
what he believed to be best, Hitler did no wrong. But it is grotesque
to think that such a belief could suffice to render such evil-doing per-
missible.
The three points just made are familiar, having been made in one way
or another by a great many writers. They suffice, I believe, to show that
View 3 is false; that is, they show that it is not the case that an agent
ought to perform an act if and only if he believes that doing so would
maximize actual value, when (a) ‘ought’ is taken to express overall moral
obligation and (b) doing what is overall morally obligatory is taken to
be the primary concern of the morally conscientious person. I stress both
(a) and (b), because they are crucial to the rejection of View 3. I have
no wish to deny that, if either (a) or (b) fails to apply, then View 3, or
something like it, is acceptable.
Consider what A. C. Ewing says: ‘We may believe . . . that the soldiers
who fight against us in a war are acting wrongly in fighting, yet every
reasonable person will admit that, as long as they really think they
ought to fight, they ought “to obey their consciences” and fight’.16 There
is clearly a tension in what Ewing says, something that he himself is
quick to recognize. How can it be that our enemies are acting wrongly
if, in doing so, they are obeying their consciences and they ought to
obey their consciences? Ewing’s answer is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous, so
15 See Michael J. Zimmerman, ‘Another Plea for Excuses’, American Philosophical
Quarterly 41 (2004).
16 Ewing, Definition, pp. 120–1.
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that the sense in which our enemies ‘ought’ to obey their consciences is
different from the sense in which they ‘ought not’ to fight us.
I do not deny Ewing’s thesis. I have denied that View 3 is true, insofar
as both (a) and (b) apply, but it is consistent with this to claim that one
ought, in some sense of ‘ought’ not governed by both (a) and (b), to do
what one believes would maximize actual value. Ewing’s remark may
seem to suggest that he accepts this claim. In fact, he does not, and
for good reason. What he does accept is the related but importantly
different claim that one ought (in some sense not governed by both
(a) and (b)) to do what one believes one ought (in the sense governed
by both (a) and (b)) to do; or equivalently, that it is wrong (in the
former sense) to do what one believes is wrong (in the latter sense).17 I
would in fact advise against putting matters in this way; such a double
use of ‘ought’ (or ‘wrong’) courts confusion. Much better is to say that
one is blameworthy if and only if one does what one believes is wrong
(in the sense governed by both (a) and (b) – in the sense, that is, in
which the primary concern of the conscientious person is to discover
and avoid doing what is wrong).18 This acknowledges and preserves
the distinction, noted earlier, between the blameworthiness of agents
and the wrongness of actions. (Redemption of Promissory Note no. 3:
just as agents can do wrong but not be blameworthy, so too they can be
blameworthy and not do wrong. Negligence – understood in one way, at
least – consists in neglecting what one believes to be one’s obligation,
and thus19 confers culpability; but the belief may be mistaken, in which
case no wrong is done.20)
17 Note that, just as ‘ought’ and ‘wrong’ can be used to do double duty in this way, so
too can ‘expect’. In one sense, all that can be expected of someone is that he do what he is
obligated to do. In another sense, all that can be expected is that he do what he believes
he is obligated to do.
There is a complication: Ewing (Definition, pp. 132–3) reserves the term ‘moral
obligation’ for a sense of ‘ought’ not governed by (b). There is a sense of ‘ought’ according
to which the primary concern of the conscientious person is to discover and do what he
ought to do. I have used the term ‘overall moral obligation’ for this sense of ‘ought’. Ewing,
however, says that one’s ‘moral obligation’ is not to do what one ought, in this sense, to
do, but rather to do what one believes one ought, in this sense, to do. This seems to me
to constitute a serious misapplication of the term ‘moral obligation’, but the dispute is
merely verbal.
18 Actually, this is only roughly correct. The conditions of blameworthiness – at
least when ‘blameworthy’ expresses moral culpability, the ‘negative’ side of moral
responsibility – are more complex. In particular, a freedom condition must be satisfied.
In addition, one can be blameworthy, even if one acts conscientiously, if one is to be
blamed for one’s conscience. (Compare Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 363.) See Michael J.
Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, 1988), pp. 40 ff. for a general
treatment of the conditions of blameworthiness.
19 See the last note for a qualification.
20 See Michael J. Zimmerman, ‘A Plea for Accuses’, American Philosophical Quarterly
34 (1997).
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It may seem that I have been inconsistent in what I have said about
conscientiousness. One acts conscientiously if one does what one be-
lieves one is overall morally obligated to do. I have said that, if one acts
conscientiously, one is not to blame.21 But I have also said that, if one
acts conscientiously, one may nonetheless act wrongly; that is, one may
nonetheless fail to do what one is in fact overall morally obligated to
do. Yet I have characterized overall moral obligation itself in terms
of conscientiousness; I have said that doing what is overall morally
obligatory is the primary concern of the conscientious person. There is
no contradiction. The conscientious person is not concerned with doing
what his conscience dictates; he is concerned with doing what he ought –
that is, is overall morally obligated – to do, and he may well worry
whether what his conscience (his set of beliefs about what he morally
ought to do) presently dictates is accurate. Thus he will not rest content
with letting his conscience be his guide; for acting conscientiously does
not guarantee that one will avoid doing wrong. This is something that
the conscientious person recognizes; it is precisely his fallibility with
respect to what his overall moral obligation is that drives his con-
scientious inquiries. However, when it comes to judging, not people’s
actions (in terms of moral obligation), but people (in terms of praise-
and blameworthiness) in light of their actions, then we should look to
whether they have acted as their consciences dictate. As long as the
two types of judgment are kept distinct, there should be no suspicion
of inconsistency.
III
The rejection of View 3 still leaves open the question whether overall
moral obligation is properly accounted for by either or both of Views 1
and 2.
To answer this question, consider the following:
Version 3:
All the evidence at Jill’s disposal indicates (in keeping with the facts)
that giving John drug A will cure him partially and giving him no
drug will render him permanently incurable, but it also indicates (in
contrast to the facts) that giving him drug C will cure him completely
and giving him drug B will kill him.
Suppose that, acting on the basis of the evidence, Jill gives John drug
C and thereby kills him. Should we say that she acted as she ought to
have done, which is what View 2 dictates, or should we deny this, as
View 1 dictates?
21 See n. 18 for a qualification.
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Many would deny it. Moore is a prime example. He would simply
apply the distinction between wrongdoing and blameworthiness to this
case too, just as he would to Version 2. He would say that, although
Jill did wrong in giving John drug C, she is not to blame for doing
so.22 Is this not just as plausible an assessment of Version 3 as it is of
Version 2?
For many years I thought that it was. I no longer think this, for
Jackson’s own version of his case undermines such an assessment.23
That version may be put as follows:
Version 4:
All the evidence at Jill’s disposal indicates (in keeping with the facts)
that giving John drug A will cure him partially and giving him no
drug will render him permanently incurable, but (despite the facts)
it leaves completely open whether it is giving him drug B or giving
him drug C that will cure him completely and whether it is giving
him drug B or giving him drug C that will kill him.
Suppose that, acting on the basis of the evidence, Jill gives John drug
A and thereby partially cures him. Should we say that she acted as
she ought to have done? Moore and others are once again committed
to denying this, but here their position is decidedly implausible. My
argument for this claim is an ad hominem one. (We have all been taught
that such arguments are to be avoided, but here it seems to me just the
right type of argument to use.) Put Moore in Jill’s place in Version 3.
Surely, as a conscientious person, he would decide to act as Jill did and
so give John drug C. He could later say, ‘Unfortunately, it turns out
that what I did was wrong. However, since I was trying to do what was
best for John, and all the evidence at the time indicated that that was
indeed what I was doing, I cannot be blamed for what I did’. But now
put Moore in Jill’s place in Version 4. Surely, as a conscientious person,
he would once again decide to act as Jill did and so give John drug A.
But he could not later say, ‘Unfortunately, it turns out that what I did
was wrong. However, since I was trying to do what was best for John,
and all the evidence at the time indicated that that was indeed what
I was doing, I cannot be blamed for what I did’. He could not say this
precisely because he knew at the time that he was not doing what was
best for John.24 Hence Moore could not justify his action by appealing to
View 1 – the view that he ought to maximize actual value – even though
22 Compare Moore, Ethics, pp. 81–2.
23 See the reference to Jackson (and Regan) in n. 14 above.
24 This renders what Moore says at Ethics, p. 82 inadequate; so too with what Brandt
says at Ethical Theory, p. 367.
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this is his official position.25 On the contrary, since conscientiousness
precludes deliberately doing what one believes to be overall morally
wrong, his giving John drug A would appear to betray the fact that he
actually subscribed to something like View 2, the view that he ought to
maximize expected value.
That giving John drug A in Version 4 would maximize expected value
seems clear. The expected value of an act is a function of the
probabilities of its possible outcomes and the actual values associated
with these outcomes. Suppose we stipulate that the actual value of
providing a complete cure is 50, that of providing a partial cure is 40,
that of killing John is –100, and that of rendering John permanently
incurable is 0. Let us further stipulate in Version 4 that, in light of the
evidence available to Jill, the probability that drug A will provide a
partial cure is (for simplicity’s sake) 1, that the probability that giving
him no drug (call this option D) will render him permanently incurable
is also 1, and that for each of drugs B and C the probability that it will
provide a complete cure is .5 and the probability that it will kill John
is also .5. (Promissory Note no. 4: I will have more to say about the
relevant notion of probability in the next section.) Then the expected
values of Jill’s alternatives are as follows:
EV(A) = (40 × 1) = 40
EV(B) = [(50 × .5) + (−100 × .5)] = −25
EV(C) = [(50 × .5) + (−100 × .5)] = −25
EV(D) = (0 × 1) = 0
Clearly, then, giving John drug A would maximize expected value.
Of course, there is reason to doubt that such exact assignments of
values and probabilities can ever be given, but the beauty and power of
Jackson’s case is that we apparently need no such exact assignments
to be confident that Jill’s giving John drug A would fail to maximize
actual value yet would maximize expected value. If it is agreed that she
ought to give John drug A, then, this would seem to suffice to disprove
View 1 while tending to confirm View 2.
There are of course responses that might be made on behalf of
View 1. Let me now attend to some.
A
One response is to claim that, despite the appearances to which I have
just appealed, the actual values of Jill’s alternatives in Version 4 have
25 Moore, Ethics, chs. 1–2.
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been miscalculated and her giving John drug A would actually be best
after all, despite the fact that it would only lead to a partial cure.
But what reason can be given for this claim? One can of course
always ‘cook the books’ (by fiddling either with the specification of
alternatives or with the specification of their values) so that View 1
yields the intuitively correct verdict that Jill ought to give John drug A,
but, unless this is done in a principled way, such a victory is merely
Pyrrhic. One such principled way would be to assign actual disvalue
to the running of risks, regardless of whether these risks are realized.
One could then argue that the extra risk associated with Jill’s giving
John drug B renders her doing so actually worse than her giving him
drug A, even though the former would be medically superior.26
This move is problematic, for two reasons. First, it seems that a
Jackson-type case can be constructed that accommodates the (alleged)
disvalue of risk.27 Second, the response implies that, from the point of
view of what counts regarding the determination of Jill’s obligation,
giving John drug B is vastly preferable to giving him drug C.28 This
seems wrong; since they are equally risky, these alternatives would
seem to be on a par with one another from the point of view in question.
B
Another response that might be made on behalf of View 1 is this.
Jackson’s case (Version 4) indicates precisely why we must distinguish
between different ‘oughts’. As View 1 implies, Jill ought1 (ought object-
ively) to give John drug B, since this is what would in fact maximize
actual value. However, we can also say with perfect consistency that
she ought2 (ought subjectively) to give John drug A, since this is what
26 Compare David Sosa, ‘Consequences of Consequentialism’, Mind 102 (1993),
pp. 109–10.
27 Recall the actual values recently assigned: a complete cure, 50; a partial cure, 40;
death, –100; no cure, 0. Suppose that the (dis)value associated with the risk in giving
either drug B or drug C is –15. Then, if we simply add in the value of risk-taking, the
actual values of Jill’s alternatives would be as follows: A, 40; B, 35; C, –115; D, 0. Even on
View 1, then, Jill ought to give John drug A. But now suppose that Jill’s evidence is such
that it is not death but rather a less serious deterioration in John’s health that she risks
if she gives John either drug B or drug C. Let the actual value of such a deterioration
be –50. Presumably, the actual (dis)value associated with risking such a deterioration
will be less than that associated with risking death. Let us stipulate that this value is
–8. Then the actual values of Jill’s alternatives would be as follows: A, 40; B, 42; C, –58;
D, 0. View 1 would then imply that Jill ought to give John drug B after all. But this is
highly dubious. Note that the expected values of Jill’s alternatives (when no actual value
is assigned to the taking of risks) would be as follows: A, 40; B, 0; C, 0; D, 0. View 2 would
thus imply that Jill still ought to give John drug A. Although the numbers just used, and
the method of aggregation, are of course spurious, their being so in no way undermines
the general point that they serve to illustrate.
28 Compare the values of 35 and –115 assigned to B and C, respectively, in the last note.
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would maximize expected value. Views 1 and 2 are thus not rivals and
can both be accepted.
This, too, is problematic. Views 1–3 are intended to account for what
an agent ought to do, when (a) ‘ought’ is taken to express overall moral
obligation and (b) doing what is overall morally obligatory is taken to be
the primary concern of the morally conscientious person. I have argued
that View 3 cannot be accepted under this dual condition, although it
might be accepted if ‘ought’ is construed differently. I counseled against
using ‘ought’ in such a way, since there is alternative terminology
available that is less confusing. So too, my present use of Version 4 is
intended as an argument against View 1, under the condition that both
(a) and (b) apply. I concede that View 1 might be accepted if ‘ought’
is construed differently. But I would once again counsel against using
‘ought’ in such a way; we can simply say that Jill’s giving John drug
B would be actually best and leave it at that, avoiding any hint of
confusion with the ‘ought’ of overall moral obligation (the ‘ought’ with
which proponents of View 1 such as Moore have traditionally been
concerned).
C
But, it may be retorted, surely the conscientious person is concerned
with the actual values of his alternatives, and so it would be a mistake
to say that the ‘ought’ of overall moral obligation is not to be understood
in terms of such values.
This misrepresents my position. Expected value is in part a function
of actual value; hence anyone concerned with the former will indeed
also be concerned with the latter.29 If, contrary to my advice, you
insist on attaching an ‘ought’ to what is actually best among an agent’s
alternatives, we can say that the fact that Jill ought to give John drug A
is in part a function of the fact that she ought to do what is
actually best and give him drug B. But in saying this we must keep
clearly in mind that the latter ‘ought’ does not express overall moral
obligation.
In Version 4, Jill is (let us assume) very much concerned – quite
correctly – with the actual values of a complete cure, a partial cure, and
death. Despite this, she quite deliberately – and again quite correctly –
chooses an alternative that she knows is not actually best.30 That is
precisely how any clear-headed conscientious agent would act under
29 Compare Howard-Snyder, ‘Thought’, pp. 273 and 280.
30 It is therefore important to distinguish clearly between View 2 and the follow-
ing view: An agent ought to perform an act if and only if it is most reasonable to expect that
doing so would maximize actual value. Jackson takes care to distinguish these views. (See
Jackson, ‘Decision-theoretic Consequentialism’, p. 468.) Others do not. See, for example,
Russell, Essays, pp. 31–2; Kagan, Normative Ethics, pp. 65–6.
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the circumstances. It would be appalling, morally speaking, if Jill were
to give John drug B; taking such a risk would be unconscionable.31
D
But, it may again be retorted, consider Gladstone Gander, one of
Donald Duck’s associates.32 Gladstone is invariably lucky; acting on
his hunches, he always manages to choose that alternative which is
actually best, despite being no less ignorant than the common person
about the details of the situations in which he finds himself. Suppose
that Gladstone were to find himself in Jill’s situation in Version 4.
Acting on his hunch in this case, he would give John drug B. Surely,
if someone invariably maximizes actual value, then he always acts as
he ought. If so, Gladstone not only would but ought to choose drug B
rather than drug A. We who are not so lucky ought to choose drug
A, since in choosing B we would run an unreasonable risk of harm to
John. But it is implausible to say that the correct moral theory should
have radically different implications for lucky and unlucky (that is,
normal) agents. Rather, we should recognize that all agents have a
fundamental obligation to maximize actual value, as View 1 declares.
Moreover, all agents have a derivative obligation to act responsibly
with respect to the production of actual value. We act responsibly in
this regard when we do not run unreasonable risks with respect to the
production of actual value. Gladstone would act responsibly if and only
if he chose drug B, but a normal agent such as Jill would act responsibly
if and only if she chose drug A. Hence Gladstone’s derivative obligation
coincides with his fundamental obligation, whereas there is no such
coincidence in Jill’s case. But Jill’s fundamental obligation does coincide
with Gladstone’s: fundamentally, she ought to give John drug B.
I find the proposed distinction between fundamental and derivative
obligation obscure, confounding, and unmotivated. It is obscure in that
it is hard to see how one obligation can be ‘derived’ from another when
the two conflict. It is confounding in that it raises once again the
question of which ‘ought’ one ought to act on.33 It is unmotivated in
that there would appear to be no good reason to say that Gladstone
has any obligation to give John drug B. His being invariably lucky
31 Compare Gibbard, Wise Choices, p. 43, n. 7.
32 I am indebted to Ingmar Persson for bringing this character to my attention and,
more generally, for forcefully pressing the case for View 1.
33 Note that, like ‘ought’, the term ‘responsible’ is treacherous. In one sense, one acts
responsibly just in case one fulfills one’s obligations (that is, one avoids wrongdoing).
This is the sense at issue here. In another sense, one acts responsibly just in case one
acts blamelessly (that is, one avoids blameworthiness). This is not the sense at issue
here. Compare the discussion in the last section concerning the distinction between
wrongdoing and blameworthiness.
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diminishes neither the degree nor the unreasonableness of the risk
that he runs in giving John drug B. His giving John this drug would be
just as unconscionable as Jill’s doing so.
It could of course happen that, at some point, Gladstone’s unbroken
string of lucky successes entitles him to rely on hunches that, up to that
point, he was not entitled to rely on. But it is precisely at that point that
he is no longer lucky when he manages to do what is actually best, in
that his choosing that act which in fact maximizes actual value would
no longer constitute running an unreasonable risk.34 And it is at that
point that his obligations would part way with those of normal agents
such as Jill.
But does this not give rise to a paradox? Suppose that Gladstone
is faced with a series of situations of the sort described in Version 4.
Right from the start, he relies on his hunch and chooses drug B. Doing so
invariably turns out best. At some point, his string of successes entitles
him to rely on his hunch. At that point, I have said, his obligation is
indeed to choose drug B, whereas previously his obligation has been to
choose drug A. But how can it be that, by consistently making a choice
of the sort that he ought not to make, Gladstone manages to make it
the case that he ought to make a choice of this very sort?
I find no paradox here. It frequently happens that one ought not to
make a choice of some sort under one set of circumstances but ought
to make a choice of that same sort under another set of circumstances.
(Consider the choice to tell a lie, for example.) As the string of successes
unfolds, Gladstone’s circumstances change. True, his being faced with
a choice between drugs A, B, and C is constant; but there is a dramatic
change in his evidence with respect to the efficacy of choosing drug B.
E
In a final effort to defend View 1, one might propose the following. Sup-
pose that Jill later comes into possession of new evidence that strongly
indicates that drug B would indeed have cured John completely.
Even if we understand and condone her having given John drug A,
should we not nonetheless say now that she ought instead to have
given him drug B? Indeed, is this not what she herself is likely ruefully
to admit? If so, View 1 is reinstated.
There are two main ways in which the claim that Jill ought to have
given John drug B may be understood: (i) she was obligated to give him
drug B; (ii) she is obligated to have given him drug B. The second
reading may be dismissed, for obligations cannot be retrospective
34 He would remain lucky in another sense: he would be fortunate to have hunches
whose promptings invariably coincide with the maximization of actual value.
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(contrary to what some philosophers maintain35). The first reading
may seem to presuppose View 1, but in fact it does not; accepting the
claim on that reading, therefore, does not provide an adequate defense
of that view. On the contrary, one could say, in the spirit of View 2,
that, by the light of her earlier evidence, in giving John drug A Jill
acted as she ought to have done, and also that, by the light of her later
evidence, she did not act as she ought to have done. Some authors are
willing to countenance both claims. (Jackson is one.36) Note, however,
that this position does not serve to reinstate View 1, since it does not
imply that Jill’s obligation is ever simply to maximize actual value. On
the contrary, it declares Jill’s obligation always to be a function not
directly of the facts, but of the evidence available to her, concerning the
actual values of her alternatives.
Although the position just outlined is perfectly consistent with the
general theme underlying View 2, I see no reason to embrace it. I think
it is a mistake to multiply ‘oughts’ in the proposed way. Certainly Jill
would be justified in saying later that it would have been better to give
John drug B rather than drug A, but there is no need also to say that
she ought to have given John drug B. (That, to paraphrase Bernard
Williams, is to provide the agent with one ‘ought’ too many.)37 It is the
evidence available to an agent at the time that determines what he
ought at that time to do.38 Later evidence is irrelevant.39
This dismissal of extra ‘oughts’ may seem too hasty, though. For the
issue just raised occurs not only across times but also across agents.
Consider a variation on Version 4 in which Jill’s evidence is as stipul-
ated, but Jack’s evidence outstrips Jill’s and strongly indicates that
drug B will cure John completely. And suppose that Jill asks Jack
whether she ought to give John drug B. What should Jack say?
If the ‘should’ in the question just raised expresses overall moral
obligation, it could be that View 2 itself would imply that Jack should
advise Jill to give John drug B; for that may be what would maximize
35 See, for example, Hector-Neri Castañeda, ‘The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: The
Simplest Solution to All of Them in One Fell Swoop’, New Studies in Deontic Logic,
ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht, 1981), p. 61; Feldman, Doing the Best, p. 43. This issue is
briefly discussed in Zimmerman, Concept, p. 37.
36 See Jackson, ‘Decision-theoretic Consequentialism’, p. 471. Compare Graham Oddie
and Peter Menzies, ‘An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Value’, Ethics 102 (1992), p. 521.
37 Compare Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1976), p. 18.
38 Compare Bart Gruzalski, ‘Foreseeable Consequence Utilitarianism’, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 59 (1981), pp. 168–9.
39 As confirmation of this, consider the matter from John’s perspective. Suppose that
Jill had ignored the risk to John, tossed a coin (‘Heads, B; tails, C’), and the coin had come
up heads. Although John would no doubt be relieved to have been completely cured, it
would surely be reasonable for him also to be very angry with Jill for having gambled so
recklessly with his life. He would think, correctly, that she had seriously wronged him in
doing so.
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expected value for Jack. But the more important question here is
whether Jack’s telling Jill that she ought to give John drug B would be
truthful.
If the evidence available to Jack is also available to Jill, then
Version 4 has in fact been misdescribed. But if Version 4 has not been
misdescribed, then View 2 implies that Jack’s telling Jill that she ought
(that is, is overall morally obligated) to give John drug B would not be
truthful.40 This seems to me the correct verdict.41 Jill ought not to give
John drug B but to give him drug A instead. It would of course remain
the case that, if Jack were to tell her that she would do best to give John
drug B, he would be speaking both truly and justifiably.
IV
I have argued that both View 1 and View 3 are false. This of course does
not imply that View 2 is true. The claim that in Version 4 Jill ought to
give John drug A is implied by a number of theses other than the thesis
that one ought in general to maximize expected value. Nonetheless, I
propose that we now take the further step of assuming that View 2 is
superior to all such rival theses and thus that we accept that what a
conscientious person would strive to do, and what any person ought to
do, is maximize expected value. I want now to refine this claim.
As noted earlier, the expected value of an action is a function of the
probabilities of its possible outcomes and the actual values associated
with these outcomes. I have already said that I will leave open precisely
what sort of value is at stake, but, in redemption of Promissory
Note no. 4, I must now say something to identify the sort of probability
at issue.
It is common to distinguish between objective and subjective prob-
ability. The sort of probability at issue here is neither of these, as they
are typically understood. Rather, as the foregoing remarks indicate, it
is an epistemic kind of probability, having to do with the evidence that
is available to the agent.42 (It is the state of Jill’s evidence in Version 4
40 Unless Jack possesses an authority such that his very pronouncements have special
evidential weight for Jill. In such a case, his telling Jill that she ought to give John drug
B might suffice under the circumstances to make it the case that she ought.
41 On p. 184 of Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), Judith Jarvis
Thomson wavers on this point, although that may in part be because she construes ‘ought’
differently.
42 If causal determinism is false, certain events are such that there is an ‘objective
probability’ less than 1 but greater than 0 that they will occur; facts of this sort may not
square with the agent’s evidence and may thus be irrelevant to the present discussion.
‘Subjective probability’, on the contrary, is typically understood in terms of the probability
(of some sort) that someone ascribes, either explicitly or implicitly, to an outcome;
ascriptions of this sort may also not square with the agent’s evidence and may thus
once again be irrelevant to the present discussion.
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that dictates that she ought to give John drug A.) We must make
sure to distinguish between evidence that is available to someone and
evidence of which that person in fact avails himself. Available evidence
is evidence of which someone can and ought, in some sense, to avail
himself. Whatever exactly this sense of ‘ought’ is, it is an epistemic
one. It is not intended to be understood to express moral obligation;
for that would introduce a circularity into View 2, according to which
moral obligation is itself a function of expected value and, hence, of
available evidence. (Redemption of Promissory Note no. 2: it is for this
reason that failure to heed available evidence is not necessarily a moral
failing and, thus, is not necessarily indicative of negligence.43)
Assignments of epistemic probability may be understood as follows.
If a proposition, p, is certain for someone, S (that is, if S is justified,
epistemically, in having full confidence in p), then the probability of p
for S is 1. If p is certain for S, then its negation, ∼p, is certainly false for
S; in this case, the probability of ∼p for S is 0. If p and ∼p are counter-
balanced for S (that is, S is justified in having some confidence in each
of p and ∼p, but no more confidence in one than in the other), then the
probability of each of p and ∼p for S is .5.44 If S is justified in having
greater confidence in p than in ∼p, then the probability of p for S is
greater than .5 and the probability of ∼p for S is less than .5; in such a
case, p may simply be said to be probable for S, and ∼p improbable.45
(It may frequently be the case that S’s situation is such that the prob-
ability of p for S cannot even in principle be assigned a precise number
between 0 and 1, but for the sake of simplicity I will here assume
otherwise.46) I will use the term ‘evidence’ to refer to whatever it is
that justifies someone’s being more or less confident in a proposition.
(I will not inquire into the nature of evidence.) The stronger S’s total
43 I do not mean to deny that there is a moral question about what evidence to seek,
use, and so on, or that the answer to this question will vary according to what values
are at stake. My point is that the notion of available evidence is itself not a moral one
but an epistemic one. The ‘-able’ indicates not simply evidence that can be accessed but
evidence that is in some sense epistemically worthy of access, so that, if one’s beliefs do
not comport with one’s evidence, one has made an epistemic mistake, whether or not one
has made a moral mistake.
44 The stipulation that S is justified in having some confidence in each of p and ∼p
ensures that the equal probabilities of these propositions are not derived simply from S’s
being wholly ignorant about them. Compare D. H. Mellor, Probability (London, 2005),
pp. 27–9, on the principle of indifference.
45 Compare Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edn. (Englewood Cliffs,
1989), ch. 2, for a somewhat similar account. However, Chisholm writes in terms of
variations in the degree (or level) of the justification that there may be for a belief, rather
than in terms of variations in the degree of belief (or confidence) that may be justified.
Also, he does not put the concept of probability to use as I have done.
46 There is, in addition, the question of how epistemic probability of the sort outlined
here relates to the standard probability calculus. Certain of the standard axioms do not
apply in the present context. I cannot pursue the issue further here.
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evidence for p, the greater the confidence S is justified in having in p.
(Presumably, in order for S to know p, p must be probable for S, but
more than that I will not venture to say – not only because of Gettier-
type concerns having to do with defective evidence, but also because of
lottery-paradox-type concerns having to do with very high probabilities
that seem nonetheless insufficient for knowledge.) It can clearly happen
that the evidence available to S regarding p is different from the
evidence available to S∗ regarding p, so that the probability of p for S
is different from the probability of p for S∗. Just what it is for evidence
to be available to someone, however, is a difficult issue that I will also
leave to one side.47
Let us now return to Version 4. There the verdict was that Jill ought
to give John drug A, because doing so would maximize expected value –
any other choice would be unacceptably risky. But this verdict may have
been too hasty. It may seem obviously correct, because it may seem
obvious what the actual values at stake are. Yet it could be that it is not
obvious to Jill what these values are. If so, this would make a difference
to what she ought to do. Let me explain.
In the last section I stipulated, for the sake of illustration, the fol-
lowing actual values: providing a complete cure, 50; providing a partial
cure, 40; killing John, −100; rendering John permanently incurable, 0.
On this basis, the following expected values were assigned:
EV(A) = (40 × 1) = 40
EV(B) = [(50 × .5) + (−100 × .5)] = −25
EV(C) = [(50 × .5) + (−100 × .5)] = −25
EV(D) = (0 × 1) = 0
These calculations reflect the (unrealistic) presupposition that the
evidence available to Jill is such that it is certain for her that giving
John drug A will partially cure him and that giving him no drug will
render him permanently incurable, while, for each of drugs B and C,
she is justified in having no more confidence in the proposition that
giving John the drug will cure him completely than in the proposition
that it will kill him. Note that, although the calculations are sensitive
to deficiencies in Jill’s evidence regarding the possible outcomes of her
options, they are not sensitive to deficiencies in her evidence regarding
the possible values of these outcomes. It is as if all the relevant values
are being treated as being certain for her, even if some of the relevant
47 For a valuable discussion of this elusive notion, see Richard Feldman, ‘Having
Evidence’, Philosophical Analysis, ed. D. F. Austin (Dordrecht, 1988).
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outcomes are not. But this could well be false. It could happen, for
instance, that all the relevant outcomes are certain while some of the
relevant values are not. For example, suppose that Jill has a pill that
she can dispense to either John (act E) or to Jane (act F), but not to
both. The pill is certain to induce a partial recovery in John but a
complete recovery in Jane. The problem is that, although John is a
human being, Jane is not – she is a hamster (Jill is both a physician
and a vet) – and Jill’s evidence concerning the relative values of
the lives of humans and hamsters is equivocal. It is certain for her
that the value of a partial recovery in John is 100, but her evidence
concerning the value of a complete recovery in Jane is divided. She is
justified in having some confidence in the proposition that hamsters’
lives are considerably less valuable than humans’, and thus to set the
value of a complete recovery in Jane at 20. But she is justified in
having equal confidence in the proposition that such an assignment
of value is merely speciesist, and that the value of a complete recovery
in Jane is actually 120. Under the circumstances, what I will call
the expectable values of Jane’s alternatives may be computed as
follows:
E∗V(E) = (100 × 1) = 100
E∗V(F) = [(20 × .5) + (120 × .5)] = 70
(Whereas the expected value, EV, of an act is a function of the prob-
abilities of its possible outcomes and the actual values associated with
these outcomes, the expectable value, E∗V, of an act is a function of the
probabilities of its possible outcomes and the probable values associated
with these outcomes.) The general lesson of Version 4 is that an agent’s
overall moral obligation is a function, not directly of the outcomes of his
options, but of the evidence available to him concerning these outcomes.
Such evidence may be empirical (as in Version 4, where the relevant
evaluative facts are implicitly taken as certain) or evaluative (as in the
present case of John and Jane, where the relevant empirical facts are
implicitly taken as certain). In his own discussion of his case, Jackson
pays attention only to empirical probabilities and ignores evaluative
probabilities. This is unwarrantedly one-sided. We should take both
kinds of probabilities into account.48 If we do so (and if we have already
48 In his ‘Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection’, Minds, Worlds, and
Conditionals, ed. Ian Ravenscroft (Oxford, 2006), and ‘Moore on the Right, the Good, and
Uncertainty’, Metaethics after Moore, ed. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (Oxford,
forthcoming), Michael Smith notes that there is no good reason to claim that overall
moral obligation is a function of empirical but not of evaluative probabilities. However,
he concludes that neither kind of probability is relevant, rather than that both kinds
are. In doing so, he appears not to recognize that the Moore-type move of (correctly)
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taken the ‘further step’ mentioned at the outset of this section), then
we will arrive at the view that overall moral obligation is a matter of
what I have called expectable value.49 Thus I now propose that, instead
of View 2 as stated, we consider moving to the following version of the
general idea that it represents:
2a. An agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would
maximize expectable value.
It seems clear, however, that this cannot be the final move, since
the evidence pertaining to the expectable values of one’s alternatives
could be just as defective as the evidence pertaining to their actual
values. Version 4 (in conjunction with the ‘further step’) shows us that,
when one’s evidence is such that maximizing actual value conflicts with
maximizing expectable value, we should sacrifice the former in favour
of the latter. But surely a similar case can be constructed in which
one’s evidence is such that maximizing expectable value conflicts with
maximizing expectable expectable value, in which case we should once
again sacrifice the former in favour of the latter.
To see the problem, consider the original assignment of values to
Version 4:
Actual Value Expected Value
A 40 40
B 50 −25
C −100 −25
D 0 0
Let us assume, unrealistically but for the sake of simplicity, that it is
certain for Jill that the value of providing a complete cure is 50, that of
providing a partial cure is 40, that of killing John is −100, and that of
rendering him permanently incurable is 0. Then the expectable values
will match the expected values. That is:
distinguishing between wrongdoing and blameworthiness is not an adequate response
to Version 4.
49 The usual calculation for expected value goes as follows: for each possible outcome,
Oi, of an act, A, multiply its probability, given A, by its (actual) value, and then sum these
products. The resulting formula for the expected value of A is this:
∑
i prob (Oi/A) × V(Oi).
The calculation for expectable value introduces a further variable, in that each possible
outcome has a number of possible values, Vj, whose probabilities must be accommodated.
The resulting formula for the expectable value of A is this:
∑
i prob (Oi/A) ×
∑
j prob (Oi
has Vj) × Vj. (For this formula to be applicable, it must be assumed that, if Vj is infinite,
then prob (Oi has Vj) = 0.)
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Actual Value Expectable Value
A 40 40
B 50 −25
C −100 −25
D 0 0
Let us further unrealistically assume that not only is it the case that
the values of providing a complete cure, and so on, are certain for Jill,
but also it is certain for her that they are certain for her. But now let
us suppose that the relevant empirical probabilities are not certain for
her. For example, I have stipulated (unrealistically) that it is certain
for Jill that giving John drug A will partially cure him; that is, that
prob(partial cure/A) = 1.
Suppose, however, that it is not the case that
prob[prob(partial cure/A) = 1] = 1.
Suppose instead that
prob[prob(partial cure/A) = .8] = .5, and
prob[prob(partial cure/A) = .4] = .5.
We could then say that
prob2(partial cure/A) = [(.8 × .5) + (.4 × .5)] = .6.
Suppose further that
prob2(death/A) = .4.
Then (given that there are no evaluative uncertainties and only
empirical uncertainties), the expectable expectable value of Jill’s giving
John drug A is this: [(40 × .6) + (−100 × .4)] = −16. Suppose that
similar calculations resulted in the following values for B, C, and D,
respectively: −30, 10, and 5. The situation would then be this:
Actual Value
Expectable
Value
Expectable
Expectable Value
A 40 40 −16
B 50 −25 −30
C −100 −25 10
D 0 0 5
Is Moral Obligation Objective or Subjective? 351
And here is the point. View 1 says that Jill ought to maximize actual
value and so implies that she ought to give John drug B. I have
argued that this is mistaken. View 2a says that Jill ought to maximize
expectable value and so implies that she ought to give John drug A.
But surely this is mistaken too. Ought she not rather to maximize
expectable expectable value and so give John drug C?
But of course that cannot be the final move, either. What if maximiz-
ing expectable expectable value conflicts with maximizing expectable
expectable expectable value? Clearly a regress threatens, and this is
troubling. There is a solution, however. Let us call what I have so far
called expectable value ‘expectable value at level 1’. Let us call what
I have called expectable expectable value ‘expectable value at level 2’.
And so on. Now, no human agent is such that there can ever be an
infinite number of levels of evidence pertaining to expectable value;
on the contrary, on any occasion the number of such levels is likely
to be very small, because one’s being justified in having any degree of
confidence in a proposition requires that one grasp that proposition,
and propositions involving more than just a few levels of such evidence
are likely to be beyond anyone’s grasp. Thus for every human agent
there will always be a level of evidence, L, such that maximization of
expectable value at that level does not on that occasion conflict with
maximization of expectable value at any higher level, either because,
owing perhaps to the agent’s cognitive limitations, there is no such
higher level or because, if there is such a level, any such level is one at
which what maximizes expectable value at it also maximizes expectable
value at level L. Let us call L the agent’s ‘definitive’ level of evidence
on that occasion. I then propose that, instead of View 2a, we accept the
following (still rough) version of the general idea it represents:
2b. An agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would
maximize expectable value at his definitive level of evidence.50
Even though still rough, View 2b is unfortunately rather complicated.51
I’m afraid, though, that that just is the lesson of Jackson’s case. Overall
moral obligation is not as simple a matter as Moore would have it or as
we might wish it to be.
50 If, for some non-human agent in some situation, there is no definitive level of
evidence, then that agent has no moral obligation in that situation.
51 Calculation of expectable value at levels greater than 1 is a complex matter, especially
since the relevant empirical and evaluative probabilities can vary independently of
one another. The fact that evidence rarely if ever yields precise probabilities (see the
discussion above of assignments of epistemic probability) simplifies the calculation in
one way, since one need not worry about computing exact products and sums. But in
another way it makes the calculation more complex, since in principle it involves the
difficulty of making fuzzy measurements (by means, perhaps, of appealing to intervals
rather than to determinate numbers).
352 Michael J. Zimmerman
V
I have all along said that Views 1–3 have been stated roughly; I have
said this even when View 2 is put in the terms of View 2b. The reason
for my saying this can now be given. To say that an act would uniquely
maximize a certain value (whether actual, expected, or expectable)
among the range of options that the agent has is to say that it is superior
in respect of such value to its alternatives in that range. There are,
however, serious problems involved in trying to spell out the relevant
sense of ‘alternative’.52 These problems can, I believe, be satisfactorily
resolved by adopting what has come to be called a ‘possibilist’ account
of obligation.53 A more precise statement of what I take to be the
correct criterion of overall moral obligation would therefore involve
a modification to View 2b that accommodates possibilism. There is no
need (and no room) to undertake such a modification here, however.54
Instead, let me attend to three objections.
A
The first is this. I myself objected earlier to View 3 that it had the
‘grotesque’ implication that Hitler did no wrong (as long as he was
doing what he believed to be best). A similar objection may be raised
against View 2b. Suppose that one is faced with the choice between
causing great pain to some innocent people or refraining from doing so,
and suppose that it would actually be best to refrain from doing so, but
that for some reason (because one’s empirical or evaluative evidence
is misleading) it would maximize expectable value (at one’s definitive
level of evidence) to cause the pain. Is it not ‘grotesque’ to think that
under such circumstances one’s overall moral obligation is to cause the
pain?
Unsurprisingly, I deny the charge. The fact is, any plausible moral
view will have implications that may initially be unpalatable. For
example, a proponent of View 1 should recognize, as Moore himself
does, the distinction between wrongdoing and blameworthiness. In
acknowledging the possibility of excuses, one is acknowledging the
possibility of blameless wrongdoing. Hitler committed enormous evil.
An application of View 1 will likely yield the conclusion that he there-
fore did great wrong.55 But even on View 1 it could be that Hitler was
blameless. This perhaps unwelcome possibility should not be dismissed
52 Compare Hector-Neri Castañeda, ‘A Problem for Utilitarianism’, Analysis 28 (1968);
Lars Bergström, ‘Utilitarianism and Alternative Actions’, Noûs 5 (1971).
53 See Zimmerman, Concept, ch. 2.
54 I address the issue in Michael J. Zimmerman, ‘The Relevance of Risk to Wrongdoing’,
The Good, the Right, Life and Death, ed. Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason Raibley,
and Michael J. Zimmerman (Aldershot, 2006).
55 Whether it does yield this conclusion depends on just how the view is developed.
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lightly. (On my view, whether Hitler was to blame depends in part on
whether he non-culpably believed that he was doing no wrong. I see no
reason to believe that he did.) An application of View 2b might yield
the conclusion that Hitler did no wrong. (Whether he did so would
depend in part on the evidence available to him concerning the relative
values of sparing and taking the lives of millions of innocents. I see no
reason to believe that his evidence differed significantly from ours in
this regard.) View 2b thus opens up the perhaps unwelcome possibility
of wrongless evil-doing in a way that View 1 does not. This of course does
nothing to diminish the evil in question and should not be dismissed
as grotesque, any more than the possibility of blameless wrongdoing
should be dismissed as grotesque. Notice that the allegation that View
3 is grotesque was based on quite different grounds, namely, that it
implies that whether one does wrong is a function of what one does
believe (as opposed to what one is justified in believing).
B
The second objection is this. In arguing for View 2b to the exclusion of
other views such as Views 1 and 3, I have done nothing to accommodate
the propriety of the question, raised in Section I, ‘What ought I to do
when I do not know what I ought to do?’ This question presupposes two
senses of ‘ought’, but View 2b provides an account of only one sense.
In an attempt to resolve this issue, let me first draw your attention
to the ‘opposite’ question, namely, ‘What ought I to do when I do know
what I ought to do?’ Everyone will agree that the answer to this question
is, ‘You ought to do that which (you know) you ought to do’. Notice
that the following question is different: ‘What ought I to do when I
know what will maximize actual value?’ Here we cannot assume that
everyone will agree what the answer is. We know what answer it is that
View 1 implies: ‘You ought to do that which (you know) will maximize
actual value’. But what answer does View 2b imply?
Return to Version 1, which goes as follows:
Version 1:
Jill knows that giving John drug A will cure him partially, giving him
drug B will cure him completely, giving him drug C will kill him, and
giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable.
I said earlier that there would be little hesitation on anyone’s part in
saying that, in this version of the case, Jill ought to give John drug B,
but I also said that there is nonetheless reason to doubt this verdict.
In redemption of Promissory Note no. 1, this reason can now be given.
Even if Jill knows that giving John drug B will cure him completely
and that giving him drug C will kill him, that by itself does not imply
that she ought to give him drug B rather than drug C – not if, for
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example, her available evidence indicates that killing him is more
valuable than curing him; under those circumstances, View 2b implies
that Jill ought to give him drug C rather than drug B. But presumably
these circumstances are ones under which Jill does not know what will
maximize actual value precisely because her available evidence con-
cerning the relevant values is defective. What, though, if her evidence
is not defective in this respect? Could there still be reason to deny that
she ought to give John drug B?
Suppose that Jill’s evidence concerning the relevant values is
accurate and, moreover, that she is justified in having a high degree
of confidence in the proposition that giving John drug B will cure him
completely. But suppose that she also has some reason to suspect that
giving him drug B will kill him, and thus that she cannot be certain
that doing so will cure him completely. Under such circumstances,
giving John drug B might be unacceptably risky, so that what Jill
ought to do is give him drug A instead. Now consider this question:
is it compatible with the circumstances just outlined that Jill knows
that giving John drug B will cure him completely? (That is, could the
high probability of the proposition suffice under the circumstances for
her knowing it, despite the fact that she also has evidence against it?)
If the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, then View 2b does not in general
imply, as View 1 does, that the answer to the question ‘What ought
I to do when I know what will maximize actual value?’ is ‘You ought
to maximize actual value’. I suspect, however, that we should not say
that, under the circumstances, Jill knows that giving John drug B will
maximize actual value. (I am in no position to insist on this, though,
having declined to specify just what the relation is between epistemic
justification and knowledge.) If this is right, then the answer that
View 2b in general implies to the question ‘What ought I to do when
I know what will maximize actual value?’ would seem to be the same
as that implied by View 1: ‘You ought to maximize actual value’. This
is because, under the circumstances envisaged, maximization of actual
value and maximization of expectable value apparently coincide.
Let us now turn to the question that is raised by the puzzle: ‘What
ought I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?’ To begin with, we
should distinguish this question from the following: ‘What ought I to do
when I do not know what would maximize actual value?’ Notice that the
latter question does not even hint at a multiplicity of ‘oughts’. Notice
also that, while the answer that View 1 provides (‘You ought to do that
which would maximize actual value’) is not at all helpful, the answer
that View 2b provides (‘You ought to do that which, at your definitive
level of evidence, would maximize expectable value’) could be more help-
ful. It is plausible to contend that it is often (and perhaps always) very
difficult (and perhaps impossible) to determine what would maximize
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actual value. (Whether this is indeed the case depends on what kind
of value is at stake and on what kind of stuff this value supervenes
on. As I said earlier, I will not investigate this issue.) But even if this
is so, determining what would maximize expectable value could well
be easier, since this only involves attending to the evidence that is
available.
I say ‘only’, but this must not be misconstrued. It could well be that on
many occasions attending to the available evidence remains a difficult
task. It should not be thought that the criterion of moral obligation that
View 2b supplies constitutes a readily applicable decision procedure.56
There is a procedure that it provides (‘Peruse the available evidence
regarding your alternatives and their possible outcomes; assess the
expectable values of these alternatives; then do that which, at your
definitive level of evidence, has the highest expectable value’), but how
easy it is to apply this procedure is another matter. Indeed, to apply
it with precision will surely always be very difficult,57 but precision
is not always necessary in order for one to be confident that one has
applied the procedure successfully. (Consider Jackson’s own case, that
is, Version 4. There it is easy to figure out what would maximize
expectable value, even if the relevant probabilities cannot be precisely
determined.58 Hence the case’s beauty and power. Still, it must also be
admitted that the case is an artificially simple one.)
Suppose that someone has tried and failed to apply the decision
procedure provided by View 2b and that the time to act has come. He
may say, ‘I accept View 2b and have tried to discover what, according
to that view, I ought to do under the present circumstances. But I have
not managed to figure this out. Now what ought I to do?’ Insofar as this
question is asked out of conscientiousness, we might construe it as a
request for help with achieving a sort of prospective ‘damage control’.
So understood, the question is asked out of a fear of doing wrong and
56 Concerning the relation between criterion and decision procedure, see: Eugene R.
Bales, ‘Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making
Procedure?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking
(Oxford, 1981); Alastair Norcross, ‘Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable Future’,
Analysis 50 (1990); Robert L. Frazier, ‘Act Utilitarianism and Decision Procedures’,
Utilitas 6 (1994); James Lenman, ‘Consequentialism and Cluelessness’, Philosophy
and Public Affairs 29 (2000); Timothy Chappell, ‘Option Ranges’, Journal of Applied
Philosophy 18 (2001); Jonas Gren, Applying Utilitarianism: The Problem of Practical
Action-Guidance (Gothenburg, 2004); Feldman, ‘Actual Utility’.
57 This is appropriately stressed in Feldman, ‘Actual Utility’. Compare also Mark
Strasser, ‘Actual versus Probable Utilitarianism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 27
(1989); Gren, Applying Utilitarianism. Compare also n. 51 above. Contrast Ewing,
Definition, who declares (on p. 128) that ‘in the light of probabilities we can determine
with relative ease and even sometimes with fair certainty what an agent ought to do’.
58 Compare a case given in Howard-Snyder, ‘Thought’, p. 276.
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in the hope that any wrongdoing can be minimized. What help can we
give?
In an effort to help, we might try invoking the distinction between
unconditional and conditional obligation. For an illustration of this
distinction, suppose that it is Matt’s overall moral obligation (as
determined by the account given in View 2b) to attend a meeting on
the first floor of his office building.59 This is to be understood as an
unconditional obligation. Even though he has this obligation, it may
nonetheless be the case that Matt also has an overall moral obligation
(as determined by an extension of the account given in View 2b) to
attend a meeting on the second floor (due to take place at the same time
as the meeting on the first floor), if he fails to attend the meeting on
the first floor. This would be a conditional obligation. It is commonplace
to observe that a conditional obligation does not in general warrant
the detachment of an unconditional obligation simply in virtue of its
condition’s being satisfied.60 If it did, then, if Matt were in fact to be
about to fail to attend the meeting on the first floor, he would have an
unconditional obligation to attend the meeting on the second floor. But
this obligation would conflict with his obligation to attend the meeting
on the first floor, and hence Matt would be in a moral dilemma. But
surely there is no dilemma. Matt’s only unconditional obligation is to
attend the meeting on the first floor. If he does that, then, even though
he must of course thereby fail to attend the meeting on the second floor,
he does no wrong whatsoever.
The commonplace observation just mentioned is simplistic. We
can and should detach unconditional obligations from conditional
obligations, while avoiding dilemmas, by invoking levels of obligation.
Let us say that Matt ought1, that is, has a primary obligation, to attend
the meeting on the first floor; that he ought2 to attend the meeting on
the second floor, if he fails to attend the meeting on the first floor; that he
ought3 to attend a meeting on the third floor, if he fails to attend either
of the first two meetings; and so on. We can say that, if Matt in fact fails
to attend the meeting on the first floor, then he has a secondary uncondi-
tional obligation (that is, he unconditionally ought2) to attend the
meeting on the second floor; and so on.61 Suppose that Matt does not
attend the meeting on the first floor. Then he does (unconditional)
59 This example and the ensuing discussion derive from Zimmerman, Concept, ch. 4.
60 Such detachment was first given the useful label ‘factual detachment’ in Patricia
S. Greenspan, ‘Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives’, Journal of Philosophy
72 (1975).
61 Factual detachment may in general be represented as follows: O(q/p)&p  O(q). My
claim is this: such detachment is valid when the obligations at issue are on the same
level. Thus, whereas we should not endorse O2(q/p)&p  O1(q), we should endorse, for
any n, On(q/p)&p  On(q). For further discussion, see Zimmerman, Concept, ch. 4.
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wrong. If he fails also to attend the meeting on the second floor, he
compounds this (unconditional) wrongdoing. If he fails also to attend
the meeting on the third floor, he compounds it still further; and so on.
Notice, however, that the relevant unconditional subsidiary (that is,
non-primary) obligations are detached if but only if the relevant
conditions are satisfied. If Matt attends the meeting on the first floor,
he does no unconditional wrong whatsoever. As it stands, View 2b
implicitly concerns only primary unconditional obligation. It can be
extended to cover subsidiary obligation. In that way levels of ‘ought’
can easily be accommodated, and moreover there is no threat of a
vicious regress; for, like the number of floors in Matt’s building, the
number of levels of obligation will be finite.
It may seem that we could apply this approach to the present pro-
blem. We might say: if you do not know what your primary obligation is,
then you have a secondary obligation to do such-and-such; if you do not
know either what your primary obligation is or what your secondary
obligation is, then you have a tertiary obligation to do so-and-so; and
so on. But, although View 2b can and should indeed be extended to
accommodate subsidiary obligation, doing so will unfortunately not
help us solve the present problem. This is because ignorance of one’s
obligation, at whatever level, does not generate some further subsidiary
obligation. Consider Matt. His primary obligation is to attend the
meeting on the first floor; doing so is, we may say, ‘deontically supreme’,
in that it is superior (from the point of view of what determines
obligation) to any of his other options. To say that he has a secondary
obligation to attend the meeting on the second floor, if he fails to attend
the meeting on the first floor, is to say that, if the option of attending
the meeting on the first floor is abstracted from his range of options
and thus discounted, then the option of attending the meeting on the
second floor becomes deontically supreme. In order for this conditional
obligation to trigger a corresponding unconditional obligation, it must
be the case that the option that is abstracted does not occur. But
then this approach cannot be applied to our present problem, precisely
because ignorance of an action’s being obligatory does not entail non-
performance of that action. Matt may be ignorant of his obligation
to attend the meeting on the first floor, but that does not trigger
an obligation to attend the meeting on the second floor. Despite his
ignorance, Matt might nonetheless attend the meeting on the first floor.
If he does, then he does no wrong whatsoever. It is therefore not in
general the case that, if you do not know what your primary obligation
is, then you have a secondary obligation to do something else.62
62 More generally still, it is not the case that On(p) & ∼K[On(p)]  On+1(∼p). Again, the
reason is that, even if you do not know that you oughtn so to act that p (i.e. ∼K[On(p)]), this
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Though initially tempting, invoking subsidiary obligation in the
effort to resolve the puzzle posed in Section I thus strikes me as futile.
And I can find no better way to handle the request for ‘damage control’.
I am afraid that, if someone has tried and failed to discover what act
View 2b requires of him, and ‘crunch time’ has come and he asks you
what he ought now to do, then if you also do not know what would,
at his definitive level of evidence, maximize expectable value for him,
all you can say is this: ‘You ought to do that which, at your definitive
level of evidence, would maximize expectable value, whatever that may
happen to be’. There is no other ‘ought’ to invoke, and at least you will
have spoken truthfully, if not helpfully.
Or rather: there is no other ‘ought’ that expresses overall moral
obligation to invoke. You can of course always resort to the familiar
answer ‘You ought to do whatever you think you ought to do’ (or perhaps
the somewhat less familiar answer ‘You ought to do whatever you think
gives you the best chance of doing what you ought to do’), but in general
this will be true only if the first ‘ought’ does not express overall moral
obligation (given that the second ‘ought’ does).63 The answer can then
be understood as equivalent to ‘You will avoid blameworthiness if you
do whatever you think you ought to do (or, perhaps, if you do whatever
you think gives you the best chance of doing what you ought to do)’,
in which case, as noted in Section II, I think it can be accepted (with
qualifications64). But, even if acceptable, this answer will unfortunately
be of little help. Even if the person asking the question does already
believe, of some act A, that he is obligated to do A (or that doing A will
give him the best chance of fulfilling his obligation) – which he may
well not, since he is seeking your advice on the matter – telling him
is consistent with your nonetheless so acting that p and thus with your doing what you
oughtn to do; and if you do do what you oughtn to do, then no unconditional obligationn+1
to act otherwise will arise.
Here is an alternative route to the same conclusion. The following principle is plausible:
On(p) & On+1(∼p/q)]  On(∼q). (For an account of moral obligation that sanctions this
principle, see Zimmerman, Concept, ch. 4.) Now suppose, for purposes of reductio ad
absurdum, that (1) you ought1 so to act that p and that (2) you ought2 so to act that ∼p,
given that you do not know that you ought1 so to act that p. In light of the principle just
mentioned, it would follow that (3) you ought1 so to act that you know that you ought1
so to act that p. But surely (3) is, as a general rule, false: we do not in general have
an obligation to know what our obligations are; that is, we are sometimes justifiably
ignorant of our obligations. Thus, if (1) is true, (2) is false; and if (2) is false, no secondary
obligation so to act that ∼p will arise from your ignorance that you ought1 so to act
that p.
63 The ‘oughts’ could both express overall moral obligation and your answer could still be
true, since it can of course happen that a person is both obligated to do A and believes that
he is obligated to do A. But your speaking truthfully would then be sheer happenstance,
since ex hypothesi both you and he are ignorant of the fact that his belief about what he
ought to do is accurate.
64 See n. 18 above.
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that he will avoid blameworthiness if he acts on this belief may provide
him with some sort of consolation, but it simply does not address his
concern with avoiding wrongdoing.
Here, then, is how I would respond to the puzzle posed in Section
I. The question ‘What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought
to do?’ is indeed perfectly cogent, but its cogency does not entail a
multiplicity of ‘oughts’ and we should resist any suggestion that there
is such a multiplicity (barring the ‘oughts’ of subsidiary obligation – but
they are not pertinent here).65 The best answer that we can give to it,
helpful or not, is simply this: ‘You ought to do whatever it is that would,
at your definitive level of evidence, maximize expectable value’. If the
person who asks the question believes that there is a better answer, he
is deluding himself.
C
This response to the puzzle is perhaps more a dissolution than a solu-
tion of it and may for that reason be disappointing.66 It may provoke the
following third and final objection: ‘If the unhelpfulness of the response
“You ought to do that which, at your definitive level of evidence, would
maximize expectable value” (made to someone who has not been able
to figure out what would maximize such value) is not sufficient reason
to reject View 2b, then the unhelpfulness of the response “You ought
to do that which would maximize actual value” (made to someone who
has not been able to figure out what would maximize such value) is
not sufficient reason to reject View 1. But in that case there is no
need to move from View 1 to View 2b in the first place’. This, however,
misrepresents the reason for moving from View 1 to View 2b. That
reason was not to find a helpful response to the question ‘What ought
I to do when I do not know what would maximize actual value?’67
Rather, the move was dictated by the recognition that Jackson’s case
(Version 4) shows quite clearly that it is not in general the case that
one ought, in the sense that expresses overall moral obligation, to
65 I think we should also resist any suggestion that there is a multiplicity of ‘rights’
and ‘wrongs’. (Contrast Ross, quoted in Section I above.) One acts wrongly just in case
one fails to do what one ought; one acts rightly just in case one avoids acting wrongly.
Just as there is only one ‘ought’ in the sense of overall (unconditional, primary) moral
obligation, so too there is only one related sense of ‘right’ and only one related sense of
‘wrong’. Compare Ewing, Definition, p. 118.
66 On pp. 237 ff. of ‘Prichard on Duty and Ignorance of Fact’, Ethical Intuitionism, ed.
Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford, 2002), Jonathan Dancy proposes a solution to our problem
that is certainly not a dissolution of it but which, at the same time, correctly (as I have
argued) avoids multiplying senses of ‘ought’. I believe the solution fails, for reasons that
there is no space to discuss here. (Briefly, though: his solution appears both to violate the
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and to entail that moral dilemmas arise in situations
in which it is implausible to think that they do.)
67 Contrary to the suggestion made in Feldman, ‘Actual Utility’, pp. 50 and 62–3.
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maximize actual value. If the response ‘You ought to do that which,
at your definitive level of evidence, would maximize expectable value’
is helpful to someone who has not been able to discover what would
maximize actual value, that is simply a bonus, and not the purpose, of
the move from View 1 to View 2b. That the latter view does not itself
furnish a helpful response to the further question ‘What ought I to
do when I do not know what would maximize expectable value at my
definitive level of evidence?’ gives no reason to reject it in turn.
VI
What, finally, should be said, in the light of View 2b, in response to
the question ‘Is moral obligation objective or subjective?’ The answer of
course depends on what ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are taken to mean. In
one common sense, obligation may be said to be objective if it is possible
for someone to be mistaken about what he ought to do, and subjective
otherwise. On this understanding, View 2b implies that obligation is
objective. (As is not the case with View 3, even if one knew that View 2b
was true, one could easily fail to know what one ought to do.) This seems
to me exactly what we should say. Conscientiousness presupposes that
obligation is objective, in this sense. If obligation were not objective,
conscientiousness would thus be fundamentally delusional, which it
surely is not.
In another common sense, obligation may be said to be objective if it
is not even in part a function of the agent’s mental state, and subjective
otherwise. On this understanding, View 2b implies that obligation is
subjective. (Note that, even though View 2b implies that what one ought
to do is in part a function of what one is justified in believing rather
than of what one does believe, still what one is justified in believing is
a function of what one does grasp or understand.) Lest this be thought
objectionable, it is worth pointing out that even adherents of View 1 are
likely to take obligation to be subjective, in the present sense. (Whether
this is in fact so will depend on how exactly they develop their view.)
Moore himself, for example, takes obligation to be restricted to those
acts that he calls ‘voluntary’ (in the sense that one would perform them
if one chose).68 Moreover, it seems clear that any plausible view of
obligation must take it to be subjective, in the present sense. This is
because whether one is a moral agent (in the sense of being capable of
having moral obligations) is surely in part a function of one’s mental
capacities. Normal adults are moral agents, whereas infants and non-
human animals are not, and this has at least in part to do with the
difference in their mental capacities.
68 Moore, Ethics, pp. 5 ff.
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Views 1 and 2b would thus appear to be on a par with respect to
whether moral obligation is objective or subjective, in the two senses
just discussed. Perhaps there is a third sense that would serve to
distinguish these views in this regard. For example, one might claim
that, although View 1 should be understood to imply, as View 2b does,
that an agent’s state of mind is an ‘enabling condition’ of his being
obligated to perform some act,69 it does not imply, as View 2b does, that
that act’s being obligatory ‘supervenes’ at all on the agent’s mental
state. In the end, though, whether we say that overall moral obligation
is ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ is an issue of small moment. What matters
is whether View 2b is true. If it is not, we must search for another
alternative to View 1, for that view is certainly false.70
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69 Compare Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford, 2004), pp. 38 ff.
70 Earlier versions of this article were presented to audiences at the following
universities: Cambridge, Gothenburg, Lund, Oxford, Stockholm, and Uppsala. For
comments on those or other occasions I am grateful to Robert Adams, Gustaf Arrhenius,
Simon Blackburn, Johan Brännmark, John Broome, Åsa Carlson, Roger Crisp, Sven
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